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WHAT FUTURE FOR THE CORPORATE TAX IN THE NEW CENTURY?

ABSTRACT

It has long been recognised that the corporate tax suffers from several inherent
deficiencies. However, in recent years, the transformation and integration of the world
economy has exacerbated and highlighted these weaknesses, placing a question mark over the
future of the tax. Through an examination of the problems besetting the tax today, a critical
analysis of the conventional justifications for it, and a review of economic and political factors
relevant to its continued existence, this article considers its future in the new century.
Five main criticisms of the tax are identified. First, allocating profit between tax
jurisdictions is becoming increasingly problematic. Second, it is poorly equipped to adapt to
new forms of commerce. Third, because of the existence of international tax differentials, it
distorts the optimum allocation of global investment. Fourth, it distorts the capital structures of
companies. Finally, it is increasingly inequitable.
Theoretical justifications for the tax are unconvincing. Its continued existence is more
likely due simply to the importance of its revenues to government and political obstacles to its
abolition.
The main present threat to the tax’s existence is its possible repeal in an important
economy such as the US, subsequent to which smaller countries may have no choice but to
follow suit. A further threat is that increased tax competition may reduce the comparative
importance of corporate tax revenues to governments. This, together with likely increased
costs of compliance and enforcement, may eventually force governments to reconsider the
merits of retaining the tax.

Classification codes: H25 Business Taxes, F02 International Economic Order

Keywords: corporate taxation; tax revenues; tax competition
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WHAT FUTURE FOR THE CORPORATE TAX IN THE NEW CENTURY?

1. INTRODUCTION
The taxation of corporate income (“the corporate tax”) is a widespread source of
government revenue; today, in one form or another, it forms part of the tax systems of nearly
all developed nations. However, in recent years, it has come increasingly under attack. To
long-standing criticisms of the tax purely in a domestic context have been added more recent
complaints that it is ill adapted to a world economy that is becoming increasingly integrated
and influenced by technological change.
Recent developments have combined to make the world a smaller place. In particular,
advancing globalisation and the advent of electronic commerce have increased the
interdependency of individual economies. This has brought with it an increased awareness of
the need to formulate new sets of rules on an international basis to govern the new global
environment. In some areas of international taxation, admirable progress has been made, for
example on the use of tariffs and subsidies in the trade area. However, by contrast,
comparatively little has been done to regulate corporate taxation. This lack of international
co-ordination is at the heart of many of the problems besetting the tax today.
In view of recent global developments, the purpose of this paper is to critically review
the current role and functions of the corporate tax, and, in this light, to consider its future.
Indeed, a more basic question is considered of whether the tax can, or should, survive in the new
century. While recently all taxes have, to one extent or another, been subject to pressures of
change in fast-transforming domestic and global environments, these pressures have been
applied most intensely to the corporate tax, since the corporate domain has been largely at the
forefront of economic and technological changes. The future of the corporate tax is, then,
important in the broader issue of how the structure of individual countries’ tax systems, and of
the international tax system, might evolve in future.
The paper is divided into five further sections. The next section considers recent
criticisms of the tax, and why these have become more pronounced in recent years. The paper
then discusses why, in spite of these complaints, the tax remains widely in use. Section 3
analyses the more conventional justifications put forward for the tax’s existence while section 4
considers further explanations for its durability. The future of the tax is discussed in section
5. Section 6 concludes.

2. THE CORPORATE TAX UNDER ATTACK
Recent economic, political and technological developments have provoked renewed
criticisms of the corporate tax. These criticisms are now outlined in turn.
a. Allocational Issues Across Jurisdictional Boundaries
When companies operate in more than one taxing jurisdiction, the question is raised of
how to allocate the profits raised between those jurisdictions. In particular, policies and
practices need to be established on how to charge transfers of physical goods, services and
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intangible property between business units within a multinational group (transfer pricing). Over
time, an international consensus has been built up, establishing the “arm’s-length principle” for
transfer pricing, i.e. that intra-group transactions should be priced as though they were being
transacted by independent persons. This international consensus culminated in the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations in the mid1990s, since when they have been regularly updated.
This consensus is now under great strain, for several reasons. First, the sheer volume of
international intra-firm transactions is providing an enormous challenge to the regulatory efforts
of national tax authorities.1 Second, the operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are
becoming more integrated. When the various functions involved in international operations (for
example, trading, risk-management, funding, marketing, administration, etc.) need to be factored
into transaction prices, traditional methods of ascertaining these prices are no longer adequate
(see Doernberg and Hinnekens, 1999). Third, MNEs are becoming more service-oriented, and
are relying more on intangibles such as brands and intellectual property to create wealth. These
are difficult to price. Finally, as mentioned by Owens (1993), these highly integrated companies
are increasingly able to take advantage of economies of scale, making price comparisons with
unrelated parties increasingly inappropriate.
Because of these developments, the arm’s-length consensus is now in danger of breaking
down. If it does so, the world may be left with what many consider to be a second-best
alternative, such as the unitary or arbitrary formula approach to income allocation, or indeed no
consensus at all.2

b. Problems Posed by Electronic Commerce
Electronic commerce compounds the problem of income allocation mentioned above.
E-commerce enables MNEs to further integrate their operations, making it difficult for tax
authorities to identify and measure contributions to profit and allocate them to different
jurisdictions. This problem is augmented by the often unique features of electronic contributions
to profit, which make it difficult to determine their economic value.
Further, as mentioned by Warren (2002), the growth of the Internet and of secure global
company-based intranets has enabled companies to shift profits more easily from one tax
jurisdiction to another to avoid tax. The lack of a secure and verifiable audit trail makes it
difficult for tax authorities to identify transactions and trace where they take place, expanding
the scope for both tax avoidance and evasion.
The advent of e-commerce creates an even more fundamental problem for the
administrators of the corporate tax. Commonly, companies that are held to be resident in a
country are taxed on their worldwide income. Non-resident corporations are normally
subject to tax in that country only if their operations constitute a “permanent establishment”
there, and then only on domestically-sourced income. Thus the concepts of residence,
1

According to Eden (1998), intra-firm transactions at the international level account for almost fifty percent of
trade for industrialised countries.
2
Under the unitary approach, the allocation of profits earned in more than one jurisdiction depends not on the
source of the profits, nor on the residence of the head office, but on the application of a pre-determined formula to
world profits. It is widely considered to have serious deficiencies in allocating profits (see for example, Weiner,
2001). Conversely, for arguments in support of this approach, see for example Tyson (1996).
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permanent establishment, and the source of income are essential in the assessment of income
to tax. However, with the borderless technology of the Internet significantly reducing the
relevance of geographical considerations, the above concepts have become increasingly
obsolete (indeed, the advent of e-commerce puts the entire traditional concept of jurisdiction
to tax into question). In particular, there is a growing need for a new international consensus
on the definition of a permanent establishment. Any such consensus would likely make the
definition more complex, and thus possibly easier to avoid. It has been suggested that the
location of web servers be used to determine residency or permanent establishment.
However, servers are geographically very mobile, and can easily be placed in lowest-tax
locations.
A final problem that electronic commerce creates for the corporate tax concerns the
characterisation of income. A further international consensus has been built in that the nature
of the income in question determines the extent and form of the tax applied to it. In
particular, royalty income is commonly taxed through withholding taxes in the source
country when the payment is made to the non-resident. Sales income, on the other hand, is
normally taxed as profits in the country where the seller is resident or has a permanent
establishment. Electronic commerce blurs the already hazy distinction between these two
types of income. For example, if a digital product is purchased over the Internet, does the
consideration involved constitute income from sales or is it a royalty from the right to use or
for the use of the product’s copyright? The difficulties involved in providing a definitive
answer to this question allow considerable opportunity for tax avoidance.

c. Distortions to the Optimum Global Allocation of Resources
The tax systems of individual countries, almost without exception, have developed
primarily to address domestic concerns, such as the redistribution of income and wealth, the
macro-economic stabilisation of the economy, and the allocation of productive resources within
the economy. Like any tax, the level at which the corporate tax is imposed in a country is
therefore a reflection of the political, economic and social realities of that nation. Thus, as
corporate taxes were introduced throughout the world, tax differentials between countries
inevitably materialised. Although individual countries’ tax systems have always affected and
been affected by other economies, policy makers usually paid little attention to international tax
differentials, as their effects were comparatively insignificant. Now, with the removal of nontax barriers to investment and the integration of national economies, and the resultant increase in
the mobility of international capital, corporate tax differentials are much more consequential, as
they have an increasingly important role in determining the level and destination of foreign
direct investment (FDI) (see, for example, Ruding, 1992; Baker and MacKenzie, 2001).
International corporate tax differentials, through their influence on investment
location decisions, disrupt the optimum allocation of resources and reduce economic
efficiency. This misallocation of resources is at the expense of the comparative advantage of
countries in production and trade (see Ricardo, 1819), and leads to diminished world capital
productivity and reduced levels of global output. International corporate tax differentials
therefore pose an efficiency problem to the world economy as a whole.3

3
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Since this was first recognised as a growing problem, two alternative solutions have been
put forward. The first of these maintains that co-ordinated inter-governmental action can
effectively remove tax differentials by aligning tax levels. However, while efforts to achieve
such co-ordination have been made for many years, in particular in the European Union (EU),
progress has been very slow and, so far, small. Obstacles to progress are numerous and varied in
nature, and include, for example, the need to harmonise the level and composition of
government expenditure as well as taxation if investment distortions are to be removed, the
economic upheaval involved in coordination to companies and to economies as a whole, and the
effect of international coordination on the distribution of tax revenues amongst countries.
Especially important is the jealousy with which individual states cling to their sovereignty on
matters of taxation (one of the very few areas in EU law where unanimity is required to pass
legislation).4
According to the second school of thought, co-ordination between governments is not
necessary, as the problem of tax differentials is self-correcting. As countries compete for
investment from overseas, international tax differentials are reduced through a process of
what has been termed “international tax competition”. Competitive pressures will force the
“prices” of investing in countries, i.e. taxes, together. In other words, countries will
spontaneously harmonise their tax systems or face the loss of international investment and the
disadvantages this brings.5 Recent studies suggest that some spontaneous harmonisation is
indeed taking place. Using data from nineteen developed economies over the period 1982 to
2003, Simmons (forthcoming) showed that the dispersion of statutory corporate tax rates fell
by approximately one-third, while similar results were recorded for effective tax rates.
Nevertheless, recent evidence on effective tax rates (Baker and McKenzie, 2001;
European Commission, 2001) suggests that international tax differentials currently remain
high (at least in the EU) and represent a strong incentive for companies to choose the most
tax-favoured locations for their investments. If tax competition is reducing distortions to
investment, it clearly still has some way to go. Also, there are conceptual problems on
relying on tax competition to reduce distortions to investment. As Musgrave and Musgrave
(1990) argue, there is no clear theoretical backing for the supposition that tax competition
will eventually result in a more efficient allocation of resources through reducing tax
differentials. An equally likely scenario is that tax competition will foster a climate in which
countries aim to attract capital through being tax-efficient rather than being least-cost
locations, leading to greater rather than less distortion.

d. Distortions to Corporate Capital Structure
The corporate tax has long been criticised in that it favours one kind of finance
(interest-paying debt) over another (shareholders’ equity), since debt interest is usually
deductible in the calculation of taxable profits, whereas dividends are normally not.6 The
4

For a further discussion of the many difficulties involved in corporate tax harmonisation in the EU, see for
example James (2000).
5
These potential disadvantages can nowadays be severe; investment inflows from overseas have been growing in
significance to the economic health of individual countries. According to UNCTAD (2001), global inward FDI
flows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation nearly tripled between 1997 and 1999, rising from 5.9%
to 16.3%.
6
This distinction brings into question the very nature of the corporate tax base. Since interest on debt capital is
deductible, the corporate tax does not represent a tax on the profits of a corporation before taking into account a
return on capital employed. But also, since no country currently gives an allowance against tax for a "normal"
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separate tax treatment of debt and equity capital creates a tax-induced distortion to the
optimum capital structure of corporations, since the tax confers a benefit onto the raising of
funds through debt. This distortion also raises corporate risk, as it increases the chances of
excessive gearing and bankruptcy.
More recently, the distinction in the treatment of debt and equity has resulted in artificial
investment forms that can be classified as debt but have the desired characteristics of equity
(Cooper and Gordon, 1995). The difficulties that this situation has created have in recent years
been exacerbated by the development of derivatives and other financial instruments that make
the distinction between debt and equity much less clear than in the past. As Alworth (1998,
p.512) explains:
“The tax systems of most countries are wont to subdividing transactions into
particular categories which are then subject to specific provision…Since
derivatives and other financial instruments allow easy modification of the
external attributes of financial arrangements (transforming dividends into interest
payments for example through the lending of securities) these separations have
become increasingly arbitrary.”
As a result of these innovations, differences between countries’ tax rules permit wide
opportunities for international tax arbitrage, for example through benefiting from the treatment
of a receipt as a dividend in one jurisdiction while deriving a deduction as an interest expense for
the corresponding payment in another (see Citron, 2002).

e. The Corporate Tax and Equity
There are two issues involved with regard to the fairness of the corporate tax. The first
of these concerns the effective incidence of the tax, the second the problem of “double taxation”.
The first issue rests upon the perception that a company per se cannot bear tax: only
individuals can do so. Tax on corporate profits will thus ultimately be borne by the
individual stakeholders in the company. Customers may bear the tax through an increase in
the prices they are charged, the extent of the increase depending upon the degree of
imperfection in competitive conditions. Employees may bear the tax through a reduction in
their remuneration or an increase in unemployment, depending on the degree of imperfection
in the labour market. Suppliers of capital may suffer the tax due to a reduction in the returns
they are willing to accept. However, in a completely open economy, suppliers of capital will
require the “world rate of return” or they will invest their money elsewhere. In this scenario,
the corporate tax cannot reduce investors’ returns below that world rate, but can only lead to
a decrease in the amount of capital they invest (see Bond et al., 2000, p.23). Therefore, in a
small open economy with few barriers to foreign investment, the incidence of the tax is likely
to be borne completely, or at least more heavily, by providers of labour (and perhaps by
consumers) than by the suppliers of capital. In light of recent increases in the international
mobility of capital, its effect is therefore likely to be increasingly regressive.

return on equity, the corporate tax cannot be said to capture the "pure" profits of a corporation (that is, its
income in excess of the remuneration of all factors of production, including capital). It is therefore not easy to
define conceptually exactly what the tax seeks to capture.

5
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In practice, then, the ultimate incidence of the corporate tax depends on how the tax
burden levied on corporate profits is redistributed onto their various stakeholders. As this
will vary by company, by industry, and by country, depending upon the elasticity of demand
for the product and the elasticity of supply for capital and labour, the incidence of the tax
throughout an economy is hard to predict (see Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). Although this
uncertainty is not necessarily inequitable in itself, it is likely to confound government
attempts to distribute the tax burden in a manner which it considers fair.
A second equity issue concerns the double taxation of income, which is widely
considered to be inequitable, as it represents “over-taxation”. Most countries tend to adopt
tax systems that include taxes on the incomes of both companies and the shareholders of
those companies. This leads to either the unfairness of double taxation on distributed profits or
the necessity to avoid this by introducing technically complicated systems such as imputation.
Under the “classical” system, currently pertaining in, for example, the USA, company
profits are taxed at the corporate level and then at the individual level when distributed. As no
credit is given to the shareholders for tax suffered at the corporate level, this system results in
double taxation. If one sees a company as being merely a conduit for income as it makes its way
to its owners, then, in principle, there is little justification for taxing distributed profits at the
corporate level. From this viewpoint, the corporate tax acts merely as a huge withholding tax on
distributions, collectable at a convenient stage for the government.
Imputation systems represent one common way of relieving double taxation. Under
these systems, part or all of the corporate tax charged on dividends is imputed to shareholders
against their personal income tax liability on such dividends. However, the growing
international dispersion of share ownership has accentuated a deficiency of these systems. A
fully neutral treatment of investment income requires that countries not discriminate between
domestic and foreign shareholders by denying to the latter the tax credit that the imputation
system provides. Nonetheless, in practice there is a natural strong reluctance to grant foreign
shareholders the tax credit, as it would have to be given by a different tax authority from the one
levying the corporate tax. Thus imputation systems disfavour the foreign ownership of share
capital. In times when the ownership of corporations was mostly domestic, this aspect of
imputation did not constitute a major problem. Now, with the diffusion of share ownership
throughout the world, the inequity of this situation is more apparent. In the EU, the European
Court of Justice has recently ruled this aspect of imputation incompatible with single market
freedoms. 7 This has resulted in some countries, for example Ireland, moving away from
imputation back to the classical system, with its attendant double taxation implications for
shareholders in those countries.
As the above analysis suggests, recent economic and technological developments
have transpired to accentuate and draw attention to the inherent weaknesses of the corporate
tax. In light of this, it is useful to review the justifications that have been traditionally put
forward for the tax. These are identified and critically analysed in the following section.

7
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3. EMERGENCE OF AND CONVENTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
CORPORATE TAX
The first taxes on corporate income were introduced by individual states of the USA in
the mid-19th century. In the early years of the following century, many countries began a
process of moving away from their traditional indirect tax base towards direct taxation. A
federal tax on corporate profits was introduced in the USA in 1909 and, as a war-time measure,
in the UK in 1915, where it represented an additional tax on company profits to that already
imposed upon individuals’ income from capital. The tax then spread rapidly to other nations,
until today it is almost universally applied in the developed world.
The original rationale for the introduction of the new tax was that companies were, as
they are now, separate legal entities from their owners (whose liability is limited to the sums
they invest in the enterprise), with the right of perpetual independent existence, and the right
to sue and be sued (Oates, 2002). Thus if individual persons were subject to taxation on their
income, it was considered reasonable that corporate persons should also be so. From the
outset, then, a separate corporate tax was felt to be justified in that it was perceived as the price
to pay for the privilege of incorporation with limited liability.
However, it is not clear why being granted the legal privilege of limited liability is an
appropriate justification for the taxation of company profits, or, more specifically, why the
benefits of incorporation should be thus considered proportional to those profits (see, for
example, Kay and King, 1991). It has been suggested that a licence fee would be more
appropriate (Krever, 1985; James and Nobes, 2003). Indeed, the first business income taxes
mentioned earlier evolved from licenses and were flat fees. In any case, it can be argued that
incorporation already comes with a price: in the statutory audit and information dissemination
requirements.
A further rationale for the corporate tax is that, as it gives the government more
flexibility with regard to fiscal policy, it is potentially useful as an additional tool in macroeconomic stabilisation. Indeed, this role may even have strengthened recently in some
countries, as a result of restrictions on the use of alternative stabilisation strategies.8 However,
it has long been recognised that corporate tax policy is something of a blunt, and slow-acting,
instrument with which to regulate the economy. Not only is it subject to the usual time lags
involved in fiscal policy, but it is also normally collected well in arrears (James and Nobes,
2003). Also, the corporate tax is nowadays less suited to a role as a domestic macro-economic
stabiliser than, say, the individual income tax, since its level is highly influenced by tax levels
overseas due to competition for mobile capital.
It is also argued that the tax prevents the possibility of individuals shifting their
earned personal income into corporate income, thus avoiding tax. Securing government
revenue in this way would, on the face of it, appear to be an important function of the
corporate tax. Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995) go as far as to say that

8

In the EU, monetary union and the use of a common currency have meant that to a large extent many member
states have surrendered their ability to control their economies through exchange rate and monetary policy. This is
on top of earlier surrender of control over tariff and trade policy.
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“…the primary role of the corporate tax appears to be as a backstop to the
personal tax on labour income rather than as a tax on the return to capital
invested in the corporate sector.”
However, the type of tax avoidance activity mentioned above can and has been successfully
countered in several countries through the introduction of specific anti-avoidance provisions,
although such legislation necessarily complicates the tax system.9 At any rate, to rest the
case for an entire tax on the inability of another to counter abuse is less than convincing.
The underlying argument here for the corporate tax is that, in its absence, while the
individual income tax system would capture corporate income distributed as dividends,
retentions would remain untaxed. It is true that in practice no country attempts to fully
impute corporate profits to shareholders.10 However, retained profits can be, and commonly
are, taxed in other ways. For example, capital gains taxes (or, eventually, death duties)
eventually capture retained profits through the increase in the capital value of the shares upon
disposal (or death). Thus this argument for the tax is merely that it prevents the deferral (as
opposed to the avoidance) of the tax liability on retained profits.
It is further argued that the tax gives those countries receiving inward investment
(“host” or “source” countries) the ability to tax corporate income originating on their
territory, even (and especially) if the corporation is foreign-owned. In its absence, the
income of foreign shareholders would not be captured by the domestic tax system. The
international tax system has over the years evolved whereby the right to tax active business
income is given primarily, or at least first, to the host country (by contrast, the right to tax
passive, non-business income is normally granted to the residence country). This role of the
corporate tax would be especially important in capital-importing countries such as Australia
and Canada (Oates, 2002). The recent overall rise in the importance of FDI to the health of
individual economies has arguably made this rationale for the tax of greater significance.11
Certainly, the host country has a reasonable claim to tax company profits originating
on its territory, since it is providing cost-reducing services to the corporate sector. Examples
of these are the provision of infrastructure, the basic education of the workforce, or the
provision of security through police force and armed services. But does this justify the
existence of the corporate tax? It is difficult to discern a clear relationship between the
benefits to a company of public services and the corporate taxes that the company pays.
Also, the host country is likely to gain from foreign investment in ways other than tax
revenue, such as the creation of employment for the local population. Perhaps most
importantly, there are alternatives to the corporate tax; the host country government can, and
usually does, take its “cut” from the profits of the foreign-owned company through other
means, such as withholding taxes on dividends and other transfers overseas, excise duties or
payroll taxes.
Taken as a whole, then, the conventional theoretical arguments in favour of the
corporate tax would not appear to be entirely convincing, suggesting the existence of further
reasons for its durability. These are considered in the next section.

9

Examples include “service company” legislation in Hong Kong.
An exception to this is the system for “S” Corporations in the US, where a partnership election for certain
clearly defined companies is allowed if all shareholders agree.
11
For an indication of the importance of these flows, see note 5 above.
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4. REASONS BEHIND THE DURABILITY OF THE CORPORATE TAX
Two further considerations support the continued existence of the corporate tax: the
importance of the government revenues it produces and the political difficulties involved in
its abolition.
For an understanding of the importance of corporate tax revenues to governments, these
revenues are displayed as a percentage of total tax revenues and of GDP in Table 1 below. The
table shows these percentages at five-year intervals from 1980 to 2000 and for 2002 for the
fifteen (pre-enlargement) EU member states as a whole (EU15), and for the OECD as a
whole.

Table 1 about here

For the EU15, tax revenues from corporate profits as a percentage of total tax revenues
rose from 5.8% in 1980 to 8.6% in 2002, an increase of nearly one half. For the OECD, the
percentage also rose, from 7.6% to 9.3%, an increase of approximately one-quarter. Tax
revenues from corporate profits as a percentage of GDP show a similar story, with the increases
for the EU15 and OECD being roughly two-thirds and two-fifths respectively. In all cases, the
increases were continuous between 1980 and 2000, with a small decrease being recorded
between 2000 and 2002.
Corporate tax revenues thus in general constitute a significant, and (at least until
recently) increasing, proportion of total tax revenues and GDP. Abolishing the corporate tax
would, then, deprive governments of a useful source of revenue, and thus is likely to be strongly
resisted. In some individual countries, this proportion is far larger than the EU or OECD
averages, such as for Luxembourg (20.5% of total revenues and 8.6% of GDP in 2002) and
for Australia (16.8% and 5.3%). The abolition of the tax would likely meet with even firmer
resistance in these countries.
Revenues from the corporate tax are important today for another reason. Many
developed economies, in particular Japan and certain Western European states, currently face
intensifying budgetary crises due to a rapid ageing of these countries’ populations. This
phenomenon is leading to difficulties for governments in fulfilling their public retirement
promises and to increases in health and social care spending. At the same time, countries’ tax
bases are being reduced, as the population of working age declines. Other issues that will put
pressure on governments for increased public expenditure include environmental concerns
and, more recently, measures to counter terrorism. It would be extremely difficult in times of
present and future budgetary exigency to convince governments that a major source of public
revenue should be discontinued. This is in spite of the fact that if the tax were abolished,
governments would likely recoup at least some of this foregone revenue through subsequent
increases in receipts from capital gains taxes (through increases in share prices) and personal
income taxes (through increased dividend income). Corporate investment is also likely to be
enhanced, with subsequent indirect benefits for the government exchequer, through, for
example, greater employment.

9
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A second reason for the tax’s longevity is its degree of support from the general
population. Such support rests on the belief that it redistributes income within society, since
the tax is seen as being borne by shareholders who are, in general, more affluent than those
who do not own shares. However, there are problems with this belief. Share ownership has
become more diffused across society, at least in developed countries, and is now hardly the
sole province of the rich. Further, the redistributional consequences of the corporate tax may
well be misperceived. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the effective incidence of the tax may
now fall more on labour (through lower wages and/or unemployment) and consumers
(through higher prices) than on the owners of capital. Nonetheless, it is likely that this
transfer of the tax burden is not fully appreciated by the general public. The corporate tax is
therefore to some extent “hidden”, and as such is comparatively attractive to governments
who, sensitive to the views of their electorate in matters of taxation, have always been keen to
“pluck the goose with the least amount of hissing”.
Also, to the person in the street, it appears reasonable to tax corporations. They
benefit from public expenditure, such as the provision of infrastructure. They are entities that
have an important effect on society and on the lives of individual citizens. Indeed,
companies, especially multinational enterprises, are seen by some as being overly powerful
and answerable to no one. Further, as the tax has been a part of nearly all developed
economies for many years, its existence today is widely taken for granted. In addition to
these existing preconceptions, the abolition of the tax would certainly result in windfall gains
for those who bought shares at prices that at the time reflected the expectation of the
continued existence of the tax. It is likely that these gains would not be widely appreciated
by the general public. Thus, the tax’s removal is likely today to appear unacceptable, if not
perverse, to a large section of the electorate.
In sum, revenue considerations and political risk-avoidance are likely to be decisive
factors in any individual government’s decision as to whether to retain the corporate tax.
Indeed, to date, no government that has introduced the tax has ever repealed it.

5. THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATE TAX
The above analysis suggests that recent criticisms of the corporate tax have been
heightened by the increased interdependency of nations’ economies. Any effective solution
would thus require an orchestrated international response. A radical solution that has been
put forward is the worldwide abolition of the tax. 12 Certainly, such a bold international
initiative would remove at a stroke most of the concerns referred to above. However, given
the economic and political difficulties confronting any individual government’s attempt to
repeal the tax, and in light of the unsuccessful attempts at international co-ordination of
corporate taxes to date (after all, worldwide abolition represents an extreme form of coordination), any solution along these lines must, in anything but the long term, be considered
remote.
Nonetheless, it might well be the case that if a major participant in the world economy
decided to take it upon itself to be the first to abolish the tax, others may be willing to follow
12

The Economist Newspaper has consistently advocated abolition of the tax. See, for example, in the Economist,
“Taxes for Corporate Europe”, 21st March 1992, and “Time to Hiss: A Bad Tax whose Time has Gone”, 31st
January 2004. Abolition of the tax has been considered in the past in several individual countries, for example
in the UK by the Meade Committee (Meade, 1978).
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suit. This would more likely be the case if the move resulted in attracting significant amounts of
investment away from them and reducing the viability of their own corporate tax regimes. It is
of course highly likely that in such a scenario the “first mover” would be very attractive as a
haven to park paper profits.
There are currently two potential candidates for the role of first mover: the EU and the
US. Take first the EU. A central feature of the EU’s approach to economic integration has,
since its founding, been the principle that the allocation of productive resources should not be
distorted by the actions or policies of individual governments. The abolition of corporate
taxation would certainly represent a complete, albeit radical, solution to such distortion.13 While
the EU thus has a clear incentive to abolish the tax within its borders, there are serious practical
obstacles to this becoming a reality. The EU is of course composed of individual states, each,
as mentioned earlier, with its own veto on matters relating to taxation, and so the seemingly
intractable problems mentioned earlier in obtaining agreement would apply. The failure of all
the European Commission’s proposals to date on the approximation of corporate taxes in the EU
attest to the very low likelihood of their abolition within that bloc.
The US is a potential first mover simply because the debate in that country is at a more
advanced stage than elsewhere. As alternatives to the present corporate income tax, two variants
of an expenditure tax were heavily promoted within the US Congress during the 1980s and
1990s, although neither reached the statute books. The debate shows no signs of flagging. In
March to June 2004, the House Majority Leader made a series of speeches in Congress on
radical tax reform, including the idea of a national sales tax to replace the corporate tax. The
high level at which the debate is continuing in the US suggests that if any worldwide movement
to eliminate the corporate tax is forthcoming, it is most likely to originate in that country.
Notwithstanding the above, the demise of the corporate tax seems unlikely in the
foreseeable future. How then is it likely to evolve in the 21st century? One likely
development is that costs of tax enforcement and compliance will continue to rise. In recent
years, the complexity of enforcement and compliance has increased dramatically, in particular
concerning cross-border investment, with transfer pricing and controlled foreign company
(CFC) anti-avoidance provisions being introduced in several countries and strengthened in
others. Such developments are likely to further increase costs in terms of personnel and time
for both companies and tax administrators.
A consequence of these pressures is that in future tax authorities may be more
amenable to international measures aimed at improving international exchanges of
information. In this regard, new communications technology, often viewed with trepidation
by tax administrators, may become an important ally. Progress in international information
exchange has already been made. The OECD has issued a Model Agreement on Information
Exchange (OECD, 2002) which strengthens exchange of information powers over those
traditionally contained in bilateral tax treaties. Also, tax havens, under pressure from
developed country institutions such as the OECD and the EU (see discussion on tax
competition below), have, apart from a few recalcitrants, agreed to reduce their traditional
reliance on secrecy and to exchange information with developed nations under certain
conditions.14
13

For discussions on the abolition of the corporate tax in the context of the European Union, see for example
Devereux and Pearson (1989) and Gammie (2001).
14
All but five tax havens have now committed to cooperate with the OECD with regard to improving
transparency and information sharing. For a history of this OECD initiative, see, for example, Spencer (2004).
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Developments have also taken place in response to the need for an increasingly coordinated response to the problem of allocating income between jurisdictions. In 1990, the
EU instituted its Arbitration Convention, which provides an independent mechanism for
resolving transfer pricing disputes that result in double taxation. This could well be used as a
model for international arbitration in a more global sphere. Also, the use of Advance Pricing
Agreements (APAs), in which MNEs and relevant tax authorities agree in advance on transfer
pricing methodology, has been rapidly expanding in recent years. This process is likely to
continue. Looking further into the future, there is currently discussion of the establishment of
a World Tax Organisation on the lines of the World Trade Organisation, which would,
amongst other roles, provide a forum for the arbitration of international tax disputes (see for
example, Sawyer, 2004).
The above developments notwithstanding, the future of the tax will more
fundamentally depend on whether it can continue to justify its existence in terms of
generating government revenues. As shown above, these revenues have been maintained,
and have even increased, in recent years. But will this continue to be the case in future?
In the last quarter of a century, corporate tax reform has been characterised by a
decrease in statutory tax rates in many countries (see for example Singleton, 1999; Wunder,
1999; Devereux et al., 2002). This has been due to important trends in politics and
economics, such as the election of more “business-friendly” governments and the associated
movement towards supply-side economics that has encouraged reductions in marginal tax
rates to boost productivity. It has also likely been due to increased international tax
competition for investment and paper profits.
Table 2 shows movements in statutory tax rates and a commonly used measure of
effective tax rates, the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR)15 at 10-year intervals from 1983
to 2003. The table shows data for selected countries and the average for nineteen OECD
countries (comprising the G7, all pre-enlargement EU member states excluding Denmark and
Luxembourg, plus Australia, Norway and Switzerland). The data are provided by the Institute
for Fiscal Studies (IFS).16

Table 2 about here

Statutory tax rates decreased markedly in most countries between 1983 and 1993.
This steep decline reflects the flurry of tax reform that took place in the late 1980s, following the
first moves to reduce rates in the UK and the US. The more moderate falls (and, in some cases
slight increases) between 1993 and 2003 reflect a period of comparative consolidation in most
countries, although France and Germany are still in the throes of their corporate tax reforms.
Between 1983 and 2003, the average rate for the nineteen OECD countries fell from 48% to
33%, a drop of nearly one-third. In that period, seventeen out of the nineteen countries reduced
their rates, while only two increased theirs.

The OECD regularly issues Progress Reports on its initiative. For the latest of these, see OECD (2004).
15
The EMTR represents the tax rate that applies to a marginal investment project, i.e. it summarises the impact that
taxes have on a project that just earns the minimum required rate of return after tax.
16
Data available online from the IFS at www.ifs.org.uk.
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Effective tax rates followed a similar pattern to movements in statutory rates, falling
markedly between 1983 and 1993, and then more moderately (or in some cases rising
slightly) between 1993 and 2003. Over the entire period, the average rate fell from 28% to
20%, a drop of nearly one-third. Of the nineteen countries, fourteen showed a decrease in their
EMTRs, while five showed an increase.
It is likely that tax rates will in general continue to fall. Non-tax barriers to overseas
investment will likely further decline, especially in Eastern Europe and Asia, increasing the
mobility of capital and forcing further competitive reductions in tax rates. As a recent
example of this process, most former Soviet-bloc countries that have entered the EU have
been active in reducing their tax rates to attract investment. Poland, Hungary and Latvia have
all cut their rates to below twenty percent, well below the levels pertaining in most preenlargement member states. In line with trends in corporate tax policy in Eastern Europe,
Russia recently announced its implementation of a “flat tax” at a rate of a mere thirteen
percent.
At one stage, it seemed that corporate tax competition might be curbed through the
development of international initiatives aimed at outlawing harmful tax practices. When the
OECD unveiled its recent project against harmful tax competition (OECD, 1998), the criteria
employed for identifying harmful tax practices included a country’s effective tax rate.
However, this initiative no longer targets overall tax levels. After pressure from within its
own committees, and notably from the Bush administration in the US which made its support
for some degree of tax competition clear, the OECD refocused its project away from tax
competition towards the exchange of information to counter tax evasion.
In similar vein, and at around the same time, the EU unveiled its own package to
tackle harmful tax competition (European Commission, 1997). The package included a Code
of Conduct for Business Taxation whereby member states undertook to avoid tax measures
that constitute harmful tax competition such as incentives that apply only to non-residents, or
the “ring-fencing” of tax regimes. Under the Code, however, cuts in the general level of
corporate taxation pertaining in a country are viewed as not constituting harmful tax
competition. Such a view arguably makes this kind of tax cutting more likely, leading to the
prospect of a “race to the bottom” with regards to overall tax rates, which could severely
damage revenues (see Keen, 2001).
Up to now, the impact on tax revenues of falls in tax rates has tended to be mitigated
somewhat by a concurrent expansion in nations’ tax bases (see for example Lee and
McKenzie, 1989; Collins and Shakelford, 1996). This has been achieved through, for
example, the phasing out of investment credits, a reduction in accelerated depreciation, and
attempts at tax exportation by tightening up of transfer pricing and controlled foreign
company legislation. However, this tax base expansion cannot occur indefinitely. At some
point, if tax competition continues to push tax rates downwards, this process will inevitably
impact upon government revenues.
Corporate tax revenues have up to now also been supported by improvements in
corporate productivity that have led to an increase in the relative size of the corporate sector

13

HKIBS/WPS/061-056

in many nations, such as the UK.17 This suggests that the increase in corporate tax revenues
may be explained by reference to the Laffer curve, the bell-shaped curve that explains that there
is an optimum rate of tax at which maximum government revenue is yielded. At rates lower
than this optimum, revenues will increase due to a combination of the incentive effect of the
lower tax rate on corporate activity and a decrease in the incentive to avoid or evade taxation. If,
as is now widely believed, tax rates were on the “wrong” or inverse portion of the curve before
the tax reforms of the early 1980s, then this would explain the subsequent reductions in tax rates
being accompanied by increases in corporate tax revenues.
The future direction of corporate tax revenues is likely therefore to depend largely upon
whether the deleterious effects on government revenues of reductions in tax rates will continue
to be offset by the revenue enhancing consequences of improved corporate productivity,
investment and the expansion of the corporate sector; that is, upon whether tax rates still
currently dwell on the inverse portion of the curve. Lower tax rates might also reduce the
incentive for international tax avoidance and evasion, although increased opportunities for such
activities are likely to mitigate against this.
Ultimately, however, the extent to which tax revenues will wither depends largely on
whether voters see a greater value in maintaining taxes at a comparatively high level, with,
presumably, an accompanying high level of public investment, or in allowing tax competition
to lower tax levels to encourage private investment. In other words, it may rest on the future
political persuasions of electorates as to the extent to which they accept market forces or
government involvement as the main driving force for change. It is also likely to depend
upon the extent to which governments are able to find alternative sources of tax revenue.
While limitations of space restrict a broad discussion of the future of other taxes, a few brief
comments may be useful here.
Taxes on the income of individuals have until recently been comparatively immune to
competitive pressures, since, for reasons of family ties, language, rules of professional
association, etc., the individual income tax base is normally much less internationally mobile
than the corporate one. However, its mobility is undoubtedly growing, especially within blocs
such as the EU. This means that in future, governments may find that tax revenues from this
source may well be curtailed through tax competition. The same may well be true of
consumption or expenditure taxes, at least in the case of small countries with close borders, and
in view of the fact that purchasing over borders has been facilitated by Internet technology. In
any case, the ability of governments to tax expenditure in many countries seems to have reached
a ceiling, especially in Europe where VAT rates find themselves close to the limits of their
political acceptance. In light of these limitations, tax authorities may in future find themselves
looking more to the most immobile of tax bases, property, as a source of revenue. Further
sources of revenue may be found in newer forms of taxation, such as “green” taxes, which are
likely to find increasing acceptance with the sensibilities of electorates as concerns about the
environment rise. These taxes have already made a significant impact on the structure of tax
revenues in many developed countries.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
17

Some countries, having competed aggressively for foreign investment through reductions in corporate tax
rates, have also gained significant corporate tax revenues from their expanded stock of overseas capital. Ireland
is a case in point here.
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As the world economy continues to transform and integrate, the problems posed by
the existence of the corporate tax have intensified and become more exposed. These trends
are likely to continue in future.
In spite of these challenges, the corporate tax is likely to survive in some form, at least
for the foreseeable future. Today it represents a long-established, significant and welcome
source of revenue for governments. It can be collected from an easily identifiable source, and
is widely seen as justified by the general public. As Gammie (1991, p.9) succinctly put it:
“Perhaps the most persuasive reason for retaining a separate tax on profits is not
only that we do, but that we can.”
Worldwide abolition is unlikely in the foreseeable future as it would require
international tax co-ordination on a scale that has not been in evidence to date. A more
possible scenario is that a major economy such as the US would take the lead in abolishing
the tax, in which case smaller countries would a strong incentive (or have no choice but) to
follow its lead.
Even in the absence of such a move, if competitive pressures reduce the corporate
tax’s importance to government revenues and compliance and enforcement costs continue to
rise, governments may eventually be forced to reconsider the merits of retaining the tax.
Whether this scenario will eventually materialise depends largely on uncertain future trends
in economic and political direction and the ability of governments to identify and exploit
alternative sources of revenue.
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Table 1
EU15 and OECD Revenues from Corporate Taxation as a Percentage of
Total Tax Revenues (TTR) and as a Percentage of GDP (1980-2002)
OECD

EU15

1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2002

%TTR

%GDP

%TTR

%GDP

5.8
6.4
6.8
6.9
9.2
8.6

2.1
2.6
2.6
2.7
3.8
3.5

7.6
8.0
7.9
8.0
9.7
9.3

2.4
2.7
2.7
2.9
3.6
3.4

Source: OECD Revenue Statistics (2005)

Table 2
Corporate Taxes: Statutory1 and Effective Marginal Tax Rates (EMTRs)2
OECD Selected Countries (ten year intervals, 1983-2003)
EMTRs

Statutory Rates
1983

1993

2003

1983

1993

2003

%

%

%

%

%

%

Australia
Belgium
Canada
France
Germany
Japan
Portugal
USA

50
45
44
50
63
55
55
50

33
39
35
33
58
51
40
39

30
34
36
35
40
41
33
39

32
31
16
26
43
42
48
22

21
26
25
18
38
38
24
24

24
22
25
22
30
29
19
24

OECD 19 (mean)

48

36

33

28

23

20

Notes:
1)

Statutory rates are on undistributed profits. For individual countries where the tax rate depends on the type of
industry, the manufacturing rate is used. The rate includes local taxes (or average across regions) where they
exist. Supplementary taxes are included only if they apply generally.

2)

EMTRs calculated on the following assumptions: investment is in plant and machinery, financed by equity or
retained earnings; depreciation at 12.5%; common inflation rate of 3.5%; real interest rate at 10%; no personal
taxes.

Source: IFS
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